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n the discussions on Brexit, analysts and political observers tend to presume that 
negotiations on a new framework for the relationship between the European Union and 
the United Kingdom will revolve around a compromise that would allow the UK to limit 
the free circulation of EU workers, while maintaining access to the EU single market, 
especially for services, more or less under the current rules.1 Pisani-Ferry et al. (2016) have 
gone so far as to propose a Continental Partnership (CP), in which the UK would not only be 
able to limit the free movement of persons, but would also have a seat in a ‘Council’ in 
charge of legislative coordination between the UK and the EU with the power to propose 
amendments to draft European legislation (although the European Parliament would not be 
obliged to accept them).2 These ideas in reality mimic arrangements already in existence 
within the European Economic Area (EEA). However, the more time passes and issues are 
dissected, the more I grow convinced that an agreement on those terms with the UK will 
prove impossible. 
Key ingredients in the EU single market 
The single market holds a unique place in the panorama of global regulatory models in that 
it ensures the free movement of goods, services, capital and persons based on the principles 
of mutual recognition of member states’ rules for the protection of safety, health, consumers, 
the environment and the working environment – based on the assumption that those 
national rules provide equivalent protection. When national rules are found not to meet the 
requirements of equivalent protection3 – for example, in the health and safety standards of a 
specific product or the qualifications of a professional seeking to operate in an EU country 
different from his/her country of origin – a member state is entitled to restrict free 
                                                     
1 For a thorough discussion of existing agreements between the EU, the EEA and various other 
partners, see M. Emerson (ed.), Britain’s Future in Europe: The known plan A to remain or the unknown 
plan B to leave, Brussels and London: CEPS and RLI, March 2016. 
2 See J. Pisani-Ferry, E. Röttgen, A. Sapir, P. Tucker and G. Wolff, “Europe after Brexit: A proposal for 
a continental partnership”, Bruegel, Brussels, September 2016. 
3 Under the legal procedures and the safeguards provided for by the Treaties and the ‘rules of reason’ 
established by the Court of Justice.    
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movement. In this event, the European Commission would propose legislation to raise the 
minimum level of mandatory protection so as to re-establish the conditions for free 
movement.  
In order to function, this system relies on elements of a true constitutional order. These are, 
firstly, the supremacy over national legislation of EU rules in areas of Union competence, 
and their direct effect within national jurisdictions, so that those rules become immediately 
applicable in the relations between private agents within the single market, including in 
domestic court proceedings; and, secondly, the existence of supranational institutions 
ensuring the correct application of the Treaties and Union law, i.e. the European Commission 
in its role as the guardian of the Treaties and the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU). 
Free movement of persons 
This is the context in which the question arises as to whether it would be possible for an 
international treaty with a third country – which is what the UK would become after exiting 
– to grant individual agents or companies from that country free circulation within the single 
market based on EU rules of mutual recognition and equivalent protection, while limiting 
the free circulation of EU citizens towards that country (presumably with symmetrical 
limitations of free circulation of UK nationals within the single market).  
In my view, free circulation rights – as provided for by Article 3 of the Treaty on the 
European Union (TEU) – represent an inseparable and unitary set of rights that stand at the 
very centre of EU citizenry and which therefore cannot be traded within an international 
agreement with third countries.  
This thesis is not contradicted by the safeguard clauses included in the EEA Treaty and the 
bilateral agreements with Switzerland, which only allow for temporary restrictions on free 
movement under special circumstances and by no means can be seen as a general suspension of 
free movement. It is also not contradicted by the Association Agreement concluded with 
Ukraine, which includes a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area or DCFTA (nor by the 
similar agreements concluded with Moldova and Georgia), which contains limitations of 
access of Ukrainian workers to EU labour markets, as steps in the gradual (and inevitably 
long) process of integration within the EU single market. An exception from free movement 
has been granted – clearly in view of the tiny dimension of the country – to Liechtenstein, 
which may limit the annual increase in the number of residence permits, but a lack of 
residence may not impede access by EU citizens to the local labour market. 
I also find especially misleading, in this context, the logic behind the demands to limit the 
free circulation of workers that are being voiced in many member states of the Union, and 
therefore by extension the implication that Brexit offers the occasion to revise those rules for 
the Union as a whole. As I have already argued elsewhere,4 the fallacy in this argument lies 
in its confusion of the Schengen Area with the free movement of EU citizens.  
The Schengen agreement – an intergovernmental agreement originally signed by five EC 
members in 1985 which was incorporated into EU law by the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 – 
abolished internal border controls between member states (with opt-outs by the UK and 
Ireland, but participation by Iceland, Norway and Switzerland) and established a common 
external border of the EU, supplemented by common visa controls and police cooperation. 
The Council now wants to strengthen this construction with a common border and coast 
                                                     
4 S. Micossi and R. Perissich, “The Brexit Negotiations: An Italian Perspective”, CEPS Commentary, 25 
October 2016.  
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guard. Many ongoing discussions, and tensions, between the member states in the European 
Council are centred on the issue of the effective control of the common external border 
against migrants from third countries, terrorists, drug traffickers and so on. In this respect, it 
can be said that while Schengen also has an economic dimension, it is a ‘political’ project, of 
which the UK has never been a participant.  
The principle of the free movement of people, on the other hand, is an integral part of the 
Single Market and applies to all EU countries, irrespective of whether they are part of 
Schengen. By and large, this right is not called into question in the EU. Moreover, even 
leaving aside for a moment my previous argument on the impossibility to separate the 
freedoms of movement granted by the TEU, it must be recognised that, without the free 
movement of people, even the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services 
across borders would be nullified. The City is well aware of this reality – and for this reason 
has advocated maintaining free circulation for qualified people after Brexit, without which 
their ability to operate on the continent would be crippled.  
Free movement cannot stand without the Commission and the CJEU  
Free circulation of workers is not the only obstacle to granting the UK access to the EU single 
market, and not even the most intractable. Indeed, there is another important question: once 
the UK leaves the Union and becomes a third country, on what principles would its products 
and operators circulate within the single market and, obviously assuming full reciprocity, 
would EU products and services circulate within the UK market? Certainly, the application 
of the principle of equivalent protection would not be possible without the surveillance of 
the European Commission and the ultimate adjudication powers of the CJEU; and in all 
likelihood the UK would claim similar powers of surveillance over products and services 
coming from EU countries.  
Indeed, a main motivation behind the Brexit vote seems to have been precisely to re-establish 
the full sovereignty of the Parliament in Westminster and national courts over EU legislation 
and the CJEU. But if the UK cannot accept the jurisdiction of the CJEU, and EU operators 
were unwilling to accept the jurisdiction of UK courts, then free circulation based on mutual 
recognition of rules would not function. And indeed, the room for any agreement based on 
single market principles would vanish.  
What would happen, moreover, once the European Council and Parliament, on this side of 
the Channel, and the UK Parliament, on the other side, started to modify their rules for 
market access independently, and the rules began to diverge? Would it remain mutually 
acceptable to grant market access on the basis of increasingly divergent rules? Is it 
conceivable that an international agreement could limit the ability of domestic legislative 
institutions to change domestic rules, in response to fresh and diverging demands for public 
protection in the two jurisdictions? The answer quite obviously is NO, as is confirmed by the 
fact that no international agreement of this sort has ever been signed anywhere in the world. 
International treaties granting market access to a foreign market based on the home 
country’s rules simply do not exist. In order to enter a country’s market, it is necessary to 
respect that market’s access rules.   
This is indeed a constant feature of all treaties granting access (generally or selectively) to the 
EU single market, as mentioned above. All these treaties are based in substance on full 
acceptance of European regulations, the surveillance powers of the Commission and the 
jurisdiction of the CJEU. It is not by coincidence that the Swiss government is bending over 
backwards to avoid implementing the results of its 2014 referendum limiting the 
immigration of EU workers to Switzerland – for it is absolutely clear that this would cancel 
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by a stroke of a pen more than 120 sectoral agreements concluded between the EU and 
Switzerland over the past 40 years.  
What happened with the new Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) 
between the EU and Canada is also revealing. The EU has been able to give provisional 
application to the treaty only by excluding the provisions establishing a supranational 
tribunal for the resolution of investment disputes – an institution that had met widespread 
resistance in the public opinion in many member states. Moreover, a 12-page explanatory 
document has been attached to the treaty to further clarify that it would not entail any new 
limitations on the rights of the EU and its member states to regulate security, health, the 
environment or employment, and that regulatory cooperation would be of a purely 
voluntary nature. Similar reasons explain why the TTIP negotiations have not progressed 
very far, confronted as they were by mounting popular opposition.   
‘Soft Brexit’ not an option in practice  
In conclusion, the notion of a ‘soft Brexit’, characterised by the maintenance of current 
regimes governing the free circulation in areas handpicked by the UK, while removing the 
Commission’s and CJEU’s control over the respect of the internal market rules, seems 
groundless. Once it will have sent the Article 50 notification of its intention to exit the EU, 
the UK will simply ‘drop out’ of the single market, because a general agreement on the 
continuation of existing arrangements without the supremacy of EU law and the attendant 
role of the Commission and the Court is not possible. Therefore, they will have to seek 
agreements on selective and reciprocal access to certain segments of the single market – say 
financial services – and certainly without ‘passporting’ privileges, since these are predicated 
on full acceptance of EU fundamental freedoms under the ultimate control of the CJEU.  
Moreover, in all likelihood any such set of agreements would take longer to negotiate and 
ratify than allowed by the strict timetable set by Article 50 (two years from notification). The 
only ‘softening’ mechanism that would be available in this regard would be to agree on 
transitional arrangements lasting as long as required to define the new framework of 
relations between the EU and the UK. These arrangements, however, will only be feasible if 
the UK is willing to accept a continuation of the current legal and institutional set-up of the 
EU single market as long as needed until a final settlement is agreed upon.   
